FREE Tarot Readings Enchanted World Amy Zerner and Monte Farber

John P. Hussman (guest commenter): In 2006, the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis noted “Everyone knows that a policy of bailouts will increase their number.” This week, Congress is being asked to hastily consider a monstrous bailout plan on a scale nearly equivalent to the existing balance sheet of the Federal Reserve.

As an economist and investment manager, I am concerned that the plan advocated by Treasury is essentially a plan to bail out the bondholders of financial institutions that made bad lending decisions, with little help to homeowners that are actually in financial distress. It is difficult to believe that the U.S. government is contemplating taking on the bad assets of these institutions at probable taxpayer loss and effectively immunizing the bondholders (and shareholders) of these companies.

While it is certainly in the public interest to avoid the dislocations that would result from a disorderly failure of highly interconnected financial institutions, there are better ways for public funds to accomplish this, other than by protecting corporate bondholders while homeowners remain in distress.

Now, as these bad assets get written off, shareholder equity is also reduced. What has happened in recent months is that this equity has become insufficient, so that the company technically becomes insolvent provided that the bondholders have to be paid off:
Good assets: $95

These institutions are not failing because 95% of the assets have gone bad. They are failing because 5% of the assets have gone bad and they over-stretched their capital. At the heart of the problem is “gross leverage” – the ratio of total assets taken on by the company to its shareholder equity. The sequence of failures we’ve observed in recent months, starting with Bear Stearns, has followed almost exactly in order of their gross leverage multiples. After Bear Stearns, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac went into crisis, Lehman and Merrill Lynch followed. Morgan Stanley, and Hank Paulson’s former employer, Goldman Sachs, remain the most leveraged companies on Wall Street, with gross leverage multiples above 20.

Look at the insolvent balance sheet again. The appropriate solution is not for the government to replace the bad assets with public money, but rather for the government to execute a receivership of the failed institution and immediately conduct a “whole bank” sale – selling the bank’s assets and liabilities as a package, but ex the debt to bondholders, which preserves the ongoing business without loss to customers and counterparties, wipes out shareholder equity, and gives bondholders partial (perhaps even nearly complete) recovery with the proceeds.

The key is to recognize that for nearly all of the institutions currently at risk of failure, there exists a cushion of bondholder capital sufficient to absorb all probable losses, without any need for the public to bear the cost.

For example, consider Morgan Stanley’s balance sheet as of 8/31/08. Total assets were $988.8 billion, with shareholder equity (including junior subordinated debt) of $42.1 billion, for a gross leverage ratio of 23.5. However, the company also has approximately $200 billion in long-term debt to its bondholders, primarily consisting of senior debt with an average maturity of about 6 years. Why on earth would Congress put the U.S. public behind these bondholders?

The stockholders and bondholders of the company itself should be the first to bear losses, not the public. That is the essence of what a free and fair market, and a responsible government would enforce. The investors in the companies that produced the losses should be accountable for them, and the customers and counterparties should be protected.

The case of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac was special in that government had already provided an implicit guarantee to their bondholders, so that bailout couldn’t have been done otherwise without harming the good faith and credit of the government, but it’s absurd to tell Wall Street “send us your poor and your tired assets, and we will tend to them.” The gains in financial stocks we have observed in the past two days reflects money that those firms expect to be taken out of the public pocket.

With regard to assisting homeowners, purchasing the bad mortgage securities from financial institutions will do nothing to help those homeowners because it does nothing to alter the cash flows expected of them. Congress will be a far better steward of public funds by offering distressed homeowners what amounts to a refinancing, coupled with a partial surrender of future appreciation.

In practice, the homeowner would default on the existing mortgage, but the government would purchase the foreclosed property at an amount near existing foreclosure recovery rates (presently about 50% of mortgage face value). The government would then sell that home back to the owner with a zero-equity mortgage, allowing individuals to keep their homes. Importantly, there would be an additional, marketable lien placed on the property itself in the form of what might be called a “Property Appreciation Receipt” (PAR), which would be provided to the original mortgage lender. Though it would accrue no interest, it would provide a claim to the original lender on any appreciation in the value of the home up to the difference between the foreclosure proceeds and the original mortgage amount. Note that the PAR would only become relevant at the point that the government was fully repaid.

For example, consider a homeowner with a $300,000 mortgage balance on a home now worth less than the mortgage balance itself. The government would buy the foreclosed property at say, $200,000 and mortgage it to the existing homeowner. The original lender would receive $200,000, plus a Property Appreciation Receipt (PAR), giving it a claim on $100,000 of any future appreciation of the property. If the homeowner was to sell the property later for, say, $250,000, the owner of the PAR would receive $50,000, and there would be a remaining lien on future appreciation of that same property, which would be assumed by the new buyer. If the next buyer sold the home for $250,000, no funds would be due to the PAR holder, but if it was sold for $275,000, another $25,000 would be payable. At any point the home was to sell for more than $300,000, the PAR would be fully repaid and there would be no further claim.

Some provision would have to be made for the appreciation of an unsold home, but that detail could be accomplished through some form of equity extraction refinancing. To account for time value, the claim on future appreciation could be increased at a small rate of interest. Though the credit impact of a mortgage default would likely be sufficient to dissuade solvent homeowners from making inappropriate use of the program, the government could impose additional costs or eligibility requirements to avoid such risks.

In summary, the Treasury proposal to address current financial difficulties places corporate bondholders ahead of the public, rewards irresponsible risk-taking, and sets a precedent for future bailouts. Moreover, we know from a long history of economic experience across countries that a major expansion of government liabilities is invariably followed by multi-year periods of extremely high inflation, particularly when it is not matched by a similar expansion of economic production. Such inflation would initially be modest because of the current weakness in the economy, but could pose unusual challenges to the United States in the coming years.

Congress can benefit the American public by maintaining a focus on responsibly assisting homeowners in distress rather than defending the stockholders and bondholders of overleveraged financial companies. It is essential to recognize that the failure of these companies need not result in “financial meltdown” provided that the “good bank” representing the vast majority of assets and liabilities is cut away, protecting customers and counterparties, so that the losses are properly borne out of the capital base of the companies that incurred them.

Again, everyone knows that a policy of bailouts will increase their number. By choosing who bears the losses for irresponsible decisions at these companies, Congress will also choose the scope of the bailouts that follow.

Monte here again. The Economists' Forum is, in my humble opinion, the best place for infomation on the many aspects of our current financial crisis and what should be done about it. Now here's my letter, which is born of emotion and nothing compared to the above but I was moved to write it before reading the above so my intuition was approximately correct - on the money, literally!

Watching Secretary Paulson in today's congressional hearing I was struck by his feigned concern for the common citizen. I suppose he and his Wall Street cronies, to whom he seems to have sworn his true allegience, do not want to completely kill the goose that's laid their golden parachutes, just continue bleeding us and our nation into weakness while enriching themselves.

He says that without this bailout the people will suffer. I say that since this bailout is supposed to buy up the bad mortgages from the poor, dazed and confused banks, why not forgive the mortgages and let the mortgage holders keep their modest homes? Aren't we citizens buying these bad mortgages? Or what exactly are we buying here? Here is a way to bailout those who need help; the banks stay in business and the people stay in their homes. America is the most charitable nation in the world, so this would be a far less bitter pill to swallow than billions for the compulsive gamblers disguised as securities brokers and investment bankers.

Speaking of gambling, not one cent of public money should go to save any entity that has invested in derivities or debt credit swaps; they gambled and they lost - end of story. They have fine homes to go cry in and servants to bring them the tissues. To paraphrase Charles Cotesworth Pinckney's "Millions for defence, but not one cent for tribute," billions for mortgage forgiveness, but not one cent for gamblers who've bet and lost on derivitives, debt credit swaps, and other ponzi schemes!"